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ABSTRACT
Using a cross-sectional sample of yearly observations covering 132 
countries over the 2007–2012 period, this article intends to provide 
empirical evidence that country-level governance has an impact 
on the strength of investor protection. Also, when proceeding to a 
multiple regression analysis based on income classification, as defined 
by the World Bank, one can observe a different behaviour of the 
relationship between country-level governance (proxied using the 
principal component analysis method) and the strength of investor 
protection.
1. Introduction
There is wide consensus in the academic literature that quality of country-level governance 
is determinant for economic and social development (see, for instance, Busse & Gröning, 
2009; Kray & Tawara, 2010). A recent finding by Çule and Fulton (2013) discloses that 
country-level governance exerts a significant impact on the business environment because 
an economy with a high concern for compliance with law, an adequate level of bureaucracy 
and efficient control of corruption is expected to provide the necessary framework for ensur-
ing economic performance for the business environment. This idea of a strong relationship 
between various dimensions of country-level governance and economic growth and per-
formance was also supported by other relevant studies (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 
2001; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Price, Román, & Rountree, 2011; Rodrik, Subramanian, & 
Trebbi, 2004).
Ensuring effective investor protection as a key driver of economic performance has 
become one of the major subjects of interest for academics from various economic areas. 
To our knowledge, there is a large amount of empirical studies showing different linkages 
between corporate governance mechanisms and investor protection, while too few studies 
address the impact of country-level governance on the strength of investor protection. In 
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the vision of Matoussi and Jardak (2012), corporate governance along with mechanisms 
implemented for investor protection represent ‘key drivers of market development’. On the 
contrary, there are some uncertainties about the mechanisms through which country-level 
governance has a real influence when it comes to ensuring legal investor protection (Hail 
& Leuz, 2006).
There are reasons to believe that country-level governance has an impact on the strength 
of investor protection; therefore, this study aims to contribute to the literature by presenting, 
discussing and analysing the potential impact that various dimensions of country-level 
governance could have on the strength of investor protection, based on data and variables 
computed within the reports issued by some worldwide recognised professional organisa-
tions such as the World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes variables and data 
sources employed, also presenting the research methodology used. The empirical results 
are discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 concludes the article.
2. Data and research methodology
We present empirical results for the influence of country-level governance on investor 
protection using the strength of investor protection index, based on the methodology 
developed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and updated by the 
World Bank. This indicator represents a ranking which incorporates three dimensions of 
investor protection:  transparency of related-party transactions (extent of disclosure index), 
liability for self-dealing (extent of director liability index) and shareholders’ ability to sue 
officers for improper behaviour (ease of shareholder suits index). The data referring to this 
variable – strength of investor protection – were obtained from the World Bank Doing 
Business database.1 This is an index that ranges from 0 to 10, where the higher values 
correspond to a more effective investor protection. According to Haidar (2009), the Doing 
Business investor protection index represents one of the most objective measures of investor 
protection regulations and their enforcement carried out across more than 170 countries.
The next data-set used in our empirical survey was provided by the governance indica-
tors developed by the World Bank (2012) – Worldwide Governance Indicators, where all six 
governance dimensions are quantified for more than 200 economies, starting from the infor-
mation provided by more than 40 data sources produced by over 30 various organisations 
worldwide, this database being updated on an annual basis since 2002. The main objective 
of this report is to measure the quality of governance through six governance aggregate 
indicators – 1. Voice and Accountability (GOV_VA); 2. Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence (GOV_PS); 3. Government Effectiveness (GOV_GE); 4. Regulatory Quality 
(GOV_RQ); 5. Rule of Law (GOV_RL) and 6. Control of Corruption (GOV_CC) – while 
all six of these aggregated indicators are developed based on the methodology described in 
their previous companion paper ‘Aggregating Governance Indicators’ (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Zoido-Lobaton, 1999a, 1999b).
Considering the previous result of Haidar (2009), who states that countries with strong 
investor protection tend to grow faster than countries with poor investor protection, we con-
sider it also quite relevant to investigate whether the relationship between country-level gov-
ernance and the strength of investor protection is influenced by the income categories to which 
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the sampled countries belong. We also ran the panel Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
on these data including an income classification variable to determine whether high-income 
categories have a more significant impact on the strength of investor protection, using the 
low-income categories as reference. Thus, we used the World Bank classification of world 
economies on income groups [World Bank (2012) – Country and lending groups], according 
to which all economies with a population of more than 30,000 citizens are divided into income 
groups such as low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, high-income non-
OECD and high-income OECD, having as the main criterion the gross national income per 
capita, in accordance with the World Bank Atlas methodology. This income group classification 
is set each year on 1 July because of the World Bank’s fiscal year (which ends on 30 June).
A significant amount of relevant research investigating the issue of investor protec-
tion around the world was developed by some well-known researchers such as La Porta, 
Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, 1999, 2000, 2002). Their findings confirm that 
a major influence on investor protection is given by the legal regime or the legal system 
(including both laws and their effectiveness). One of their significant findings was that 
countries with common law origins have the advantage of more effective and protective 
regulatory framework than civil law countries. Later, the world-famous Enron scandal and 
other bankruptcies that followed have determined serious concerns about investor protec-
tion in the United States, one of the major countries from the common law category, which 
also raises serious uncertainties about the validity of La Porta et al.’s findings, as was noted 
by Matoussi and Jardak (2012). Looking for arguments to validate or to invalidate La Porta 
et al.’s previous findings, the results of the study developed by Matoussi and Jardak (2012) 
confirm that one relevant explanation for the diversity of investor protection around the 
world is strongly provided by a mix of legal, cultural and political factors. On the contrary, 
considering the main characteristics of an effective country-level governance which are, 
essentially, given by the capacity of the government to design and implement sound policies 
and regulations to support development of the private sector by promoting and applying 
an effective regulatory framework, we decided to check the robustness of the model by 
introducing additional control variables that capture some of the most relevant dimensions 
of country-level governance. Therefore, in the second part of the empirical analysis we ran 
several models with control variables such as the following: 
•  Legal origin, as defined by Reynolds and Flores (1989) and La Porta et al. (1998, 
1999). Thus, one identified five possible types for legal origin of the Company Law 
or Commercial Code of each country: English Common Law; French Commercial 
Code; German Commercial Code; Scandinavian Commercial Code; and Socialist/
Communists laws.
•  Judicial independence showing to what extent the judiciary in a country is independent 
from influences of the government’s members, citizens or firms (where 1 = heavily 
influenced and 7 = entirely independent).
•  Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations showing the effectiveness of 
the legal framework in a country from the perspective of private businesses in chal-
lenging the legality of government actions and/or regulations (where 1 = extremely 
inefficient while 7 = highly efficient).
The last two control variables (judicial independence and efficiency of legal framework in 
challenging regulations) were extracted from the Global Competitiveness Report issued by the 
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World Economic Forum (2012), this report being considered one of the most comprehensive 
assessment reports on global competitiveness, consisting of a range of relevant indicators 
that embeds significant information about the economic development and the necessary 
conditions for providing long-term prosperity. The analysis was based on data collected 
for all selected variables for approximately 132 countries during the period 2007–2012 
(six years).
The research methodology consists of the following steps: 
•  Analyse the data using principal component analysis to determine the correlation 
between the country-level governance variables.
•  Run panel OLS regression on the data, testing the relationship between the strength 
of investor protection, as the endogenous variable, and the six variables for coun-
try-level governance (it should be noted that due to the high correlation between 
the six governance variables, two synthetic variables were built based on the first two 
principal components). The use of principal component analysis is not necessarily the 
only method of dealing with multicollinearity/data reduction. However, for instance, 
a technique of simply averaging the six governance variables, as used in other stud-
ies, would imply that each of them would be equally weighted, despite the fact that 
some of them might carry little additional information when compared with the rest 
(because of the high correlation). Rewriting the initial variables as a linear combina-
tion of orthogonal vectors should eliminate the need for arbitrary equal weights as 
well as arbitrarily choosing the number of governance variables relevant. Normally, 
the number of factors selected is such that each of them explains at least the common 
variance divided by the number of initial variables (should have an eigenvalue of one).
•  Choose the best model specification (fixed effects versus random effects versus between 
effects using the Hausman test).
•  Run panel OLS including the income classification variable to determine whether 
high-income categories have a more pronounced impact on the strength of investor 
protection, using the low-income categories as reference.
•  Finally, test the robustness of the model – run several models with control variables 
as proxies for main country-level governance dimensions.
As can be noted from the summary statistics presented in Table 1, all country-level govern-
ance variables vary both across countries as well as in time. The time variation is consid-
erably less pronounced than the variation across countries, which is to be expected due to 
the larger cross-sectional dimension as opposed to the time dimension of the panel series 
that was employed.
3. Discussion of results
3.1. Basic results
Unfortunately, the country-level governance variables cannot be simultaneously included 
in a panel model due to the high correlation between them.2 A simple principal component 
analysis reported in Table 2 shows that over 85% of the variance is explained by the first 
dimension; in other words, the variables are highly correlated (one can note the eigenvalue 
of the first dimension is 5.11%, which is significantly higher than the contribution of the 
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following components). Adding an additional ‘PC2’ is justified from the perspective of 
capturing the variance of a particular governance variable. Including a second component 
means that almost all of the common variance of variable ‘political stability’ is explained 
with little specific variance left.
Therefore, the six country-level governance variables were rewritten in their princi-
pal component form (which basically leads to creating two hybrid variables that capture 
the common variation of the six country-level governance variables, therefore eliminating 
the multicollinearity) and the endogenous variable (strength of investor protection) was 
regressed on the first two principal component scores. Running the regression on the first 
Table 1. summary statistics of the governance indicators.
source: authors’ calculation.
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Gov_va (voice and accountability) overall 0.0776 0.8992 −1.8600 1.7500
Between 0.8987 −1.7417 1.6333
Within 0.0776 −0.4924 0.5726
Gov_Ps (Political stability) overall −0.0592 0.8994 −2.8100 1.5100
Between 0.8865 −2.6317 1.4200
Within 0.1673 −1.6109 0.5691
Gov_GE (Government Effectiveness) overall 0.1924 0.9290 −1.5900 2.4300
Between 0.9283 −1.4733 2.2767
Within 0.0822 −0.1459 0.5674
Gov_RQ (Regulatory Quality) overall 0.2496 0.8848 −2.1600 2.0000
Between 0.8832 −2.0283 1.9133
Within 0.0880 −0.1288 0.6513
Gov_RL (Rule of Law) overall 0.0903 0.9744 −1.8400 2.0000
Between 0.9748 −1.7683 1.9400
Within 0.0733 −0.1864 0.4103
Gov_cc (control of corruption) overall 0.0980 1.0064 −1.4600 2.5300
Between 1.0045 −1.3267 2.4617
Within 0.1013 −0.365 0.571
Table 2. Principal component analysis for country-level governance variables.
source: authors’ calculation.
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
comp1 5.1138 4.7496 0.8523 0.8523
comp2 0.3642 0.0338 0.0607 0.9130
comp3 0.3304 0.2180 0.0551 0.9681
comp4 0.1124 0.0689 0.0187 0.9868
comp5 0.0435 0.0079 0.0073 0.9941
comp6 0.0356 0.0059 1.0000
variable comp1 comp2 comp3 comp4 comp5 comp6 Unexplained 
Gov_cc (control 
of corruption)
0.4238 −0.0940 −0.2532 −0.6134 −0.4760 0.3803 0.0000
Gov_RL (Rule of 
Law)
0.4318 −0.1140 −0.2014 −0.1241 −0.0154 −0.8628 0.0000
Gov_RQ (Regu-
latory Quality)




0.4263 −0.2361 −0.2489 0.0024 0.7858 0.2883 0.0000
Gov_Ps (Political 
stability)




0.3749 −0.1390 0.9080 −0.1183 0.0390 0.0104 0.0000
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three scores resulting from the principal component analysis, which are also the most sig-
nificant, shows that the coefficient for the third dimension is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, as presented in Table 3, we consider the regression only on the first two principal 
component variables.
The Hausman test (as presented in Table 4) indicates that the random effects regression 
gives more accurate results than the fixed effects specification. This was to be expected 
due to the nature of the data sample; that is, large cross-sectional dimension but quite low 
temporal dimension (six years of annual observations).
Therefore, the model chosen is a panel regression on the first two components of the 
six country-level governance variables, and includes country-specific random effects. The 
random effects regression model chosen implies that a difference of one unit for any given 
explanatory variable (for instance, a country-level governance variable or its PC1 proxy) 
for a particular unit (country) of the panel has the same response (causes the same amount 
of variation of the dependent [strength of investor protection] variable), described by the 
fixed effect ‘within-group’ regression coefficient, as would be the case if we change by one 
unit the mean value of the variable for the different countries of the panel. If such is the 
case, and estimates for between-effects (based on cross-sectional regression of the means of 
the dependent and explanatory variables) are not significantly different from within-effects 
(fixed effects) coefficients, following the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test, the random-effects 
model should be used because the values of the standard error of its coefficients are signifi-
cantly lower than its fixed-effects specification, leading to higher p values of the coefficients. 
The random effects model can be regarded as a way of weighting coefficients from the 
fixed effects and between effects (seldom used in practice) specifications. For the purpose 
of the study, no specific assumption was made that correlation is present among the errors 
obtained for different members of the panel (components of the covariance matrix other 
than the principal diagonal are zero); the variance matrix used, however, is adjusting for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity (different variances of the errors obtained on the different 
units of the panel, commonly seen in practice).




Random effects Between effects Fixed effects
Coefficient z P > z Coefficient t P > t Coefficient t P > t
Pc1 0.2442 5.5500 0.000 0.2589 5.36 0.000 0.1274 0.1084 0.240
Pc2 −0.4174 −4.8200 0.000 −0.6784 −3.61 0.000 −0.2970 0.1073 0.006
intercept 5.4129 49.6500 0.000 5.4117 49.69 0.000 5.4254 0.0153 0.000
R-squared 0.2204 0.2267 0.2264




Difference Standard errorFixed effects Random effects
Pc1 0.12744 0.24423 −0.11679 0.09906
Pc2 −0.29701 −0.41741 0.12040 0.06354
χ2 3.71
Prob. > χ2 0.1568
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Consequently, analysing the principal component regression results (as presented in 
Table 3) for the random effects specification indicated by the Hausman test, it can be noticed 
that the coefficients for the first two principal component variables are statistically signif-
icant. However, the R-squared value, which quantifies how well the model fits the data, 
is quite low. The conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that country-level 
governance does have an influence on the strength of investor protection. However, the 
global governance only explains a small part of the variation in the strength of investor 
protection variable.
The next step in our empirical analysis was to run a multiple regression analysis by 
income category;3 one can note a different behaviour of the relationship between coun-
try-level governance (proxied by the scores derived from the principal component analy-
sis) and the strength of investor protection.4 The coefficients for the principal component 
proxies are not statistically significant for the first income category (low income) and the 
R-squared value is very low (18.56%), showing no relation between the investigated varia-
bles. Therefore, when running the panel regression including all income categories, the first 
will not be used as a reference for comparison. Instead, the third (upper middle income) 
category is used as a basis to determine the impact of income classification on the relation 
between country-level governance and the strength of investor protection.
The results reported in Table 55 show that compared with the basis level (countries from 
the upper middle income category) as the income classification category increases, the coef-
ficient attached to that category does not become statistically significant (the determined 
Z value does not fall in the 95% confidence interval). However, the coefficients attached to 
the income categories 1 = ‘low income’ and 2 = ‘lower middle income’ are statistically sig-
nificant. Thus, the first two income classifications have a significant negative impact on the 
relationship between the country-level governance and the strength of investor protection, 
compared with the other three income classification effects. It can be concluded that there 
is a difference between the impact of high-income classes (income classification = 3–5) on 
the relation between country-level governance and the strength of investor protection and 
the impact of lower income classes (income classification = 1 and 2).
Our results show that the relationship between governance and strength of investor 
protection is relevant particularly for high-income classes. This finding is well justified by 
Table 5. multiple regression analysis by income category using the third income category as the basis 
level.
source: authors’ calculation.
Strength of investor 
protection Coefficient Standard error z P > z 95% Confidence interval
Pc1 0.1412 0.0691 2.0400 0.0410 0.0057 0.2767
income classification
1 (low income) −0.6804 0.3819 −1.7800 0.0750 −1.4289 0.0681
2 (low-middle income) −0.9004 0.3311 −2.7200 0.0070 −1.5493 −0.2515
4 (high-income non-
oEcD)
−0.1226 0.4033 −0.3000 0.7610 −0.9131
0.6680
5 (high-income oEcD) −0.1812 0.4189 −0.4300 0.6650 −1.0023 0.6399
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some features specific to countries included in higher income categories. The effectiveness of 
judiciary systems and the security of property rights were empirically proven as significant 
especially for countries from the highest income categories. In this vein, Gani and Duncan 
(2007) state that countries from high-income categories ‘have a record of more effective 
governance’ than countries from the lowest income categories. On the other hand, Bardhan 
(2002) notes that the performance of mechanisms for monitoring the effectiveness of public 
services is much weaker in low-income countries.
3.2. Robustness checks
Next, for robustness purposes we ran several models (as disclosed in Table 6) using the 
selected control variables described earlier (legal origin, judicial independence, efficiency 
of legal framework in challenging regulations). Legal origin is the only control variable 
that seems to have a significant impact on the strength of investor protection, its attached 
coefficient being highly statistically significant. Furthermore, the R-squared value of the 
model shows a significant increase compared with its prior value (Model 2, R-squared = 
31.82%; Model 3, R-squared = 31.63%; Model 4, R-squared = 32.12%). The coefficients 
for the principal component variables (for the governance variables) remain statistically 
significant and comparable in value and sign compared with the model which does not 
include legal origin.
The model seems to be robust. The coefficients for the principal component scores in 
the regression remain stable (comparable magnitude and same sign) after including several 
other control variables in the model. The legal origin variable seems to have an influence in 
explaining the variance in the strength of investor protection. When including this variable, 
we can notice that its coefficient is statistically significant and the R-squared value of the 
model is significantly improved when compared with the original model (the one containing 
only the governance scores derived from the principal component analysis as exogenous 
variables). The inclusion of the other control variables in the model (except for the legal 
origin) returns statistically insignificant coefficients, and a lower R-squared value than the 
model including legal origin. The results of our robustness check that reveal the influence 
of legal origin for strength of investor protection is according to previous findings in other 
studies. For instance, the relevance of type of legal origin and its enforcement was very well 
emphasised by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as founders of agency theory. They concluded 
that the rights of investors should be protected by the strength of regulatory framework. 
Even more, La Porta et al. (1998, 2000, 2002) show that the legal system represents a ‘key 
mechanism’ in providing protection of outside investors, while ‘variations in law and its 
enforcement’ should be seen as a potential explanation of why ‘firms raise more funds in 
some countries than in others’ La Porta et al. (2000, p. 4).
4. Conclusions
This article reports novel preliminary results on the relationship between country-level 
governance and investor protection. The selected country-level governance variables cannot 
be simultaneously included in a panel model due to the high correlation between them, as 
demonstrated by a principal component analysis. Therefore, in order to eliminate the corre-
lation between the governance variables, the predicted scores for the first two components 
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were employed as proxies for country-level governance, and used as independent variables 
in the panel regression. The results of the panel regression showed highly statistically signif-
icant coefficients for the first two principal components variables and an R-squared value of 
0.22. This indicates that the country-level governance indeed has an impact on the strength 
of investor protection, but the model only manages to explain a part of the variance in the 
strength of investor protection (relatively low R-squared value). To test whether or not this 
impact is felt by countries from high-income categories, the income classification variable 
was introduced in the model, using the middle category as a basis for comparison. The 
results showed that there is a difference between the impact of high-income classes (income 
classification = 3–5) on the relation between country-level governance and the strength of 
investor protection and the impact of lower income classes (income classification = 1 and 2).
The final conclusion of this study is that quality of country-level governance is relevant in 
designing a proper framework in which the maximum strength of investor protection is pro-
vided, even if the significance of governance for investor protection is felt differently for coun-
tries from high-income classes compared with lowest income countries. While the relationship 
between strength of investor protection and country-level governance is clearly dependent 
on income, other factors alter the relationship, with legal origin playing an important role.
The outline of potential solutions for enhancing the strength of investor protection is 
beyond the scope of this article, but the value added of this study could be given by empha-
sising some topics that could be investigated in further studies. One thing is clear: both rep-
resentatives of investors and the political environment should strongly collaborate in order 
to identify those adequate governance mechanisms which could contribute to enhancing 
strength of investor protection.
Notes
1.  Available online: www.doingbusiness.org (Accessed on 5 February 2013).
2.  Multicollinearity does not affect the properties of the OLS estimators. The estimators 
remain unbiased and efficient. However, in the presence of multicollinearity, OLS estimators 
are imprecisely estimated. If the goal is simply to predict Y from a set of X variables, 
multicollinearity is not a problem: the predictions will still be accurate and the overall R-
squared value quantifies how well the model predicts the Y values. Nonetheless, if the goal 
is to understand how the various X variables impact Y, which is indeed the scope of this 
research, then multicollinearity is a problem.
3.  According to the World Bank classification, economies are divided according to gross national 
income per capita using the World Bank Atlas Method, resulting in the following groups: low 
income ($1025 or less) = 1; lower middle income ($1026–4035) = 2; upper middle income 
($4036–12,475)= 3; high-income ($12,476 or more) non-OECD members = 4; high-income 
OECD members = 5).
4.  See Appendix 1.
5.  The regression was run only with the first principal component score as an independent 
variable. The second score was eliminated due to a correlation with the income classification 
variable, in order to obtain a clearer image of the impact of the income classification.
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